

International Symposium  
**Coping with Vertiginous Realities**

6 October 2018



**International Symposium**  
**“Coping with Vertiginous Realities”**

Edited by Ryoko Nishii



Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA)  
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies  
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Saturday, October 6, 2018

#303, Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA)

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS)

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ILCAA Joint Research Projects “Life as Dynamism in Search of a Methodological Connection between Affect, Thinking, and Art”



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**Opening Address**

**Ryoko Nishii (ILCAA)**



Now, we will start our international symposium “Coping with Vertiginous Realities.” My name is Ryoko Nishii and I am chairing today’s symposium. Thank you for coming to such an out-of-the way place from the city center of Tokyo. As Project Leader of Affective Studies through Fieldwork, Kakenhi, sponsor of this symposium, with ILCAA Research Anthropological Project, I would like to make a short speech.

We are honored today to have Professor Crapanzano as a keynote speaker in our International Symposium titled “Coping with Vertiginous Realities,” a term borrowed from his abstract “Vertiginous Reality Connotes the Unpredictable and Contradictory and Unconventional.”

My impression from his recently published book *Recapitulations* is that Professor Crapanzano is the adventurous sort, so we have adventurously titled this symposium “Coping with Vertiginous Realities.” We hope today’s symposium will fulfill its promise to similarly exceed mundane reality.

Before introducing Professor Crapanzano, please allow me to digress back to my undergraduate days. My first encounter with Professor Crapanzano’s work was reading *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan*, translated to Japanese in 1991, *Seirei to kekkonshita otoko* titled in Japanese. I was deeply impressed by his writing style and pleased to discover how anthropological writing could be. *Tuhami* is said to be one of the most important experimental ethnographies. Professor Uchibori, Japanese leading anthropologist, tells me he introduced this book to his students as one of four must read anthropological work.

Professor Crapanzano did not stop this *Tuhami*. He also wrote *The Harkis: The Wound That Never Heals*, *The Fifth World of Forster Bennett: Portrait of a Navajo*, *Waiting: The Whites of South Africa* and many other books. Among these, several were translated into German, French,

Italian and Japanese. The subject covered includes psychoanalysis, comparative literature and anthropology and so on.

I will now briefly introduce the other speakers and the commentators.

Dr. Akimitsu Ikeda is an up and coming anthropologist doing field work in Lebanon. His meticulous fieldwork focused on sensitive interaction in Lebanon's complex society between the Muslim, Shia, Sunni, Druze and Christians who live side by side.

The next speaker, Professor Kazuyoshi Sugawara is one of the most prominent anthropologists in Japan. He wrote numerous books during 32 years of field work in Gwi Bushmen in Southern Africa. He started his academic career as a primatologist and later, he became an anthropologist. He bridges and draws on both perspectives in his studies producing unique writing from minute observation and analysis. His work advances our understanding of humanity in term of debts as well as pledges. Professor Sugawara was natural choice to include when organizing with Professor Crapanzano.

Next, I owe the third speaker, Professor Akira Okazaki a debt of gratitude for making this symposium a reality as he made contact with Professor Crapanzano. He is a member of our affect project and continuously pushes us with his characteristically frank manner to find new aspects. His works is peculiar, in that it does to the heart of the affective phenomenon of human being.

Professor Tadashi Yanai will give comments today. He is the spiritual and theoretical leader of our affect project. He first studied anthropology at the University at Tokyo, then philosophy at Barcelona University. Recently, he published an important book entitled *An Anthropology of Images* which is the condensed essence of his anthropological and philosophical speculation on life, nature and body.

In closing, a brief word on the affect project. Its formal title is "New Anthropological Approach to Affective Studies-Through Fieldwork of Critical Situations". We treat affect as social phenomena that cannot be traced back to physiological responses or the mind of people. In other words, this is an attempt to understand affect as things that affect others or are affected by others. Following what Spinoza called "affectus," their feelings and senses such as delight, anger, sorrow, fun, pleasure are regarded not as subjective but as inter-subjective events or it might be said an occasion following the recent Professor Crapanzano term. The focus of research being the communality of affect that expands beyond individual bodies. This symposium is one such affect event, a shared experience and I believe it will push forward our research for coping unpredictable, unconventional vertiginous future. Thank you for your attention.

Next, I would like to invite Professor Crapanzano to have a keynote speech.

**“Affective Responses to Manufactured Anomie”**

**Vincent Crapanzano (The Graduate Center of the City University of New York)**



PART ONE

I should say before beginning this lecture I should state that it is my first venture in writing about contemporary politics. I find that it is impossible to be neutral, though neutrality does not necessarily exclude objectivity if one recognizes one's bias. Indeed, if you look at the papers given at the last and, I presume, the forthcoming AAA Meetings – that is meetings during Trump's presidency, you will find more activism --political activism concerning the US and its policies -- than since the Vietnam war. - This has become especially significant since the Trump's propagation of “false news,” “false facts,” or “alternate facts” has created a sort of epistemological whirlpool. It should, in any case, be obvious that I and nearly all my colleagues are highly critical of Trump and his followers.

Let me begin by saying that my talk today is, in one sense, tangential to the main theme of this conference, namely affect -- as affect is understood in its contemporary study. My primary interest is in the effect of affect, more accurately. In the way the creation and manipulation of affect can be used for all sorts of goals, ranging from the therapeutic, the pedagogic, the political, and the seductive – the amorous. Put another way, I am interested in the provocation of affect.

Before proceeding with my particular argument, I would like to say something about affect studies generally. I have to admit skepticism – not on the need to study affect, its expression and its evaluation, but on the sloppiness of some of the studies. The number of approaches to, definitions of, and attributions to affect in affect theory is dizzying. I make no claim in this brief preface to my argument today to give order to affect theory. My remarks are rather cautionary.

Most of the studies I have read, especially those of a biological or psychological nature, seem indifferent to the way different cultures conceptualize and evaluate affect and the range of

associated experiences: emotions, feelings, moods, sentiments, etc. Though they recognize the difficulty in defining affect, they usually offer one or even more than one, without recognizing that the indefinability --or at least the difficulty of defining affect -- is in an important feature of affect. I am not necessarily advocating a Wittgensteinian approach to affect but the study of the way “affect” is used in both ordinary conversation and specialized studies. How does its significance change with changes of contexts? How does it affect contexts? What are the central affects/emotions in both ordinary and scholarly discourse? Spinoza-- passed through the interpretive filter of Deleuze --stresses sadness and fear. Others might single out love. How does it affect action? Spinoza asks repeatedly.

Is “affect” used in daily conversation? When I started to think about it, I listened for it in the conversations I was having or overhearing. Guess what? I almost never heard it used. To be sure, I did hear its verbal form—to affect something, for example, to change or influence that something. When referring to a human being, including themselves, speakers usually referred to being moved by something or described their condition in terms of emotions, like anger and fear, or moods and feelings, like happy, sad, elated, depressed, anxious, afraid, or excited. Sometimes, they referred to being overcome by nostalgia or feeling of world ending. I am of course speaking of Americans.

I wonder if my observations would be the same in Japan. What is the semantic aura around whatever words you use for affect? Does it have the dual sense of being affected by – a passive sense – and an active one – to affect something? However you answer, you can see how deeply embedded “affect” and the constellations of associated concepts are embedded in grammar and, by extension, the psychology embedded in that grammar. Some theorists who see affect studies as a palliative to the dryness of post-structuralist studies ignore the role of language. Often, they describe affect as pre-conceptual. It may be, but it is, as I have stressed in discussing phenomenology, still in response to a linguistically endorsed world.

Most often when Europeans and Americans speak of context, they are referring to the immediacy of the situation in which an event – a conversation, a mood, or an action --occurs. What is less frequent is any reference to how the context is framed and evaluated -- the etiquette that framing and evaluation presupposes. By etiquette, I mean more than the appropriate behavior – or manners – but also etiquette of perception. What one ought to see, hear, smell, taste, or touch under the circumstances? In New York, for example, you do not hear the rumbling of the subway under Carnegie Hall. Of course, you do at some level. But, if you are deeply moved by the music, the

rumble is muted or, if you not so moved, you become irritated by the rumble, further destroying the aesthetic experience. Contexts, I should add, are never static, though they are usually taken as a constant. The framing of an event and its experience are never fully synchronized and should not be collapsed one in the other. The tension between them, one might say, is affectively creative.

I have already mentioned the psychology embedded in language. I could have simply said the implicit and explicit psychologies prevailing in a society. Spinoza is frequently mentioned in affect studies most often without asking what is the nature of his “psychology” --if there is one in anyway comparable to what we mean by psychology today. In other words, are – *affection* and *affectus* psychological terms? However modern we might like to make Spinoza, we have to be careful not to read him through the lenses of romanticism and post-romanticism that have so deeply penetrated our (folk) psychologies that we take for granted the universality of such notions as depth, self, innerness, subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and emotionality. We see a vacillation in affect studies between psychological approaches and non-mentalist ones in which affect is characterized as simply intensity or force. Brian Massumi, like Deleuze and perhaps Spinoza, stresses the temporal – the anticipatory – dimension of affect. The affective stance can be characterized in terms of what I would call promptitude – a readiness to be acted upon and to act. Of course, this expectant stance is continually punctuated by feelings and emotions that arise in responses to situational and proprioceptive changes. We must not forget that social life is characterized by suspense – a binding suspense perhaps. It certainly figures in the affective resonance – the mirroring and echoing – in any social engagement and the action that ensues.

## PART TWO

My focus in the remainder of this lecture is on the production of a sense of anomie through the manipulation of affect and the feelings, moods, and emotions that follow. Although anomie is usually understood impersonally as the product of contradictory social conditions, I want to stress that the production of affective anomie can be a means to personal empowerment. I am not denying the role of social and economic forces in creating the necessary conditions for an individual to assume power, but my interests lie in how power seekers can produce and manipulate anomic conditions for their own benefit but are subject to the very anomie they produce. I will compare, as odd as it may seem, curing ceremonies I observed in Morocco with the chaotic conditions that Donald Trump has produced in the United States and beyond its borders. I am

certainly not claiming that Trump is a shaman though some anthropologists, most notably Keir Martin and Jakob Krause-Jensen, have likened him to one. It is their common practice, despite their very different goals, that interests me. I argue that their unpredictable, unconventional, and contradictory behavior, which often appears at odds with their ostensible goals and the authority they seek, can produce so intense a cognitive vertigo, or affective anomie, in their audiences that they can assume power over them, if only by offering them a stable orientation point. I should note that it has been claimed that people living in chaotic conditions are particularly—and uncritically -- suggestible. They can be likened to the shipwrecked who will desperately grab at whatever flotsam is around.

My earliest extended fieldwork was in Morocco with the Hamadsha, members of an Islamic confraternity, or *tariqa* that specialized in exorcisms. Their appeal was to the urban poor. Many, if not most of them, had moved from the countryside to cities in search of work. The Hamadsha were known for their spectacular cures of those believed to be suffering from an attack or possession by a *jinn* – an irascible, essentially amoral spirit who is quick to attack anyone who has offended it. The curing ceremonies were long, highly dramatic, dissonant affairs in which a band of professional musicians played on flutes (*naira-s*) and oboes (*ghita-s*), accompanied by insistent drumming, melodic phases (*rih-s*) that were said to be pleasing to possessing spirits while the possessed danced into a deep trance. The curer would egg on his patient, sometimes gently, sometimes violently, often thrashing about in a threatening manner, until the patient fell unconscious and was revived by the curer, often, in my experience, symptom-free.

Although the ceremonies were centered on the patient, some on-lookers would also fall into trance when they heard a musical phrase dear to the *jinn* who had once taken possession of them. Some men slashed their scalps with knives until their heads were drenched in blood. Exorcisms did not aim at riding the possessed of the possessing spirit once and for all, but rather in transforming it from a malign and into a beneficent one -- that is, so long as its commands were obeyed. These commands might include wearing certain colors, always dancing to the spirit's favored air, making an annual pilgrimage to a shrine, or sponsoring a yearly ceremony. If the commands were not followed, the possessed would be struck again.

I want to focus here on one curer, because he best illustrates my argument. Qandish was the most famous curer in Meknes when I worked there. His reputation rested on his successful cures and his unorthodox methods. In fact, he was viewed with ambivalence, suspicion even, but never

as dangerous. His techniques were unpredictable, at times grotesque. I have seen him argue angrily with a jinn who had possessed an adolescent girl and refused to reveal its identity or its desires and then turn on the girl, insulting her, at times whipping her with a switch, accusing her of lying, screaming that she was pretending to be possessed. Given that the girl was voicing the spirit and the spirit the girl, it was never clear whom Qandish was addressing. He exploited this confusion. The barrage of contradictions was dizzying. When the confusion climaxed, the jinn announced its identity – at least Qandish said it did – and demanded a full exorcism, which the girl’s family could not afford. Finally Qandish performed a simple one with an oboe player and a drummer in the middle of a public square in the afternoon. (Exorcisms are usually performed at night.) The spirit departed, Qandish announced, but on condition that a larger ceremony be held. A few days later, I saw the girl at an exorcism for a man who had been “slapped” by angry jinn and was suffering from facial paralysis. Qandish suddenly saw her, charged her, jumped around her, shouted at her – the jinn -- and when the jinn refused to leave her, he dipped a chunk of hardened sugar in the blood from a sacrificed goat and forced her to eat it. Though ingesting blood is haram for Muslims, no one was shocked at the time, caught up as they were in the act. The shock came later. I have no idea whether the exorcism was successful since the girl’s family sent her back to their village.

Qandish was always playing with reality. Before interviewing him, I never knew how he would react. The first time, he answered all my questions with exceptional insight. The second time his answers did not relate to my questions, but upon reviewing my notes I realized he had answered them all but out of order. On another occasion he refused to say a word and on still another he beat me with his switch to make a point. He was clearly brilliant. He played both within and with the ritual conventions, but they were never in doubt. With me, where there were no set interview conventions, I and I believe Qandish were caught in a vertiginous reality – saved, as it were, by a shared playfulness.

When I described Qandish’s antics to psychiatrists, they immediately declared him schizophrenic. I could not convince them otherwise. For them, Qandish’s individual behavior superseded considerations of contexts and conventions – even clearly demarcated ritual ones. I have to admit that this was particularly difficult in Qandish’s case since he was not only breaking conventions but also the conventionality of conventions. By transgressing these meta-conventions, he was calling attention to the conventions – and the overriding power of their sacrality. Diagnostics was a defense against what defied the psychiatrists’ conventional understanding.

In many respects Donald Trump's behaviors, as serious, indeed as dangerous, as their consequences may be, resemble in dramatic form, but obviously not in substance and intent, those of Qandish. Substance and intent aside, there are important differences that can have consequences, I suggest, of even greater import than their immediate effect on those who are subject to them. They can backfire.

As I am primarily interested in the effect of anomic conditions on the people who are affected by it, I will only discuss Trump's tactics and strategies briefly. "I use "tactics and strategies" with caution since, as I shall argue, anomic conditions put in question any attribution of intention. They are, however, ascribed continually and unquestioningly in the media by both commentators and satirists, who have grown in number and importance since Trump's election, if not before during the campaign, and on countless blogs. More important perhaps is the near-obsessive discussion of Trump's latest acts. No president of the United States has received as much media coverage as Trump.

Let me briefly discuss some of Trump's anomic-producing practices. They will probably be familiar to you. As his positions change from day to day, often dramatically, any discussion of them immediately gives them a false stability, a specifiable intentionality, and realistic expectations. Under these circumstances prediction, always at the limit of speculation, can reach speculative heights that so defy realism that their speculative nature has to be bracketed off, if not fully denied. So noted, I discuss some of Trump's most effective maneuvers, recognizing that it is at times impossible to determine any integrating goal, other than his presumable desire for power, fame, wealth and the preservation of his presidency.

In calling attention to himself, he not only enhances his own authority but also draws attention away from other news items or frames those items as he would have them -- less through (mis)-interpretation than through falsification. There is no dialogical engagement. He simply tweets that, as my wife puts it, are like the voice of God coming from nowhere. What explanation he offers is rarely an explanation but simply unsubstantiated pronouncements. Evidence lies in the fact that he has said it. They are performatives, faulted to be sure, by the reality he evokes and by his disregard for consistency. Vested in his authority, as president, they still have a performative force that loops back on itself performing, as it were, their performativity. Were he to rationalize his inconsistencies, explain away his contradictions, and justify his sudden turn-arounds, they would

lose that force. It is as though every pronouncement is an isolate -- independent of every other one. When they are ineffective or contradictory, they are left to fall out of memory. As one of his advisors put it, Trump “delights in chaos and confusion.” The production of chaos and confusion draws attention to him since only he has the key to it, if indeed he has a key.

Any (public) challenge to his particular, if momentary, version of reality Trump dismisses as false news. He repeatedly excoriates the Press turning it into an enemy bent on destroying him. Recently, as his standing, if not his office, is threatened, he has begun to accuse dark forces in the government hell-bent on destroying him. His counterattacks are, however, directed at individuals – reporters, members of the intelligence community, those engaged in investigating his relations with the Russians, immigrants and Muslims – or at specific institutions, like CNN or the FBI, that he personifies in his ranting’s. They are to the juggler, demeaning, insulting, vulgar, racist, and peppered with sexual slurs, mainly directed at women, and unsupported accusations, such as Muslims are terrorists and Mexican immigrants are criminals and rapists. He taunts them, sneers and jeers at them, calling them names, like “crooked Hilary” or “scumbag Comey” the way children taunt each other with tags like “fat Mary” or “pretty Tommy.” Infantile, they are repeated at every mention of them without regard to context. He does not seem to realize that he is in fact demeaning himself, as apparently many of his supporters don’t in repeating his tags. As Lévi-Strauss observes in open naming systems “He who names, names himself.” There is no order to his ranting.

What is extraordinary -- and rarely noticed – is that his depictions of his enemies, their values, thoughts, and acts mirror how he himself is characterized by them. It is a form of reversed echolalia. Repetition substitutes for evidence. It is enforced by his rage – a bullying rage that, by breaking presidential etiquette, seems to be read by his supporters as a sign of power rather than a sign of weakness. He plays on a nihilistic, anti-intellectual, violent undercurrent, but weakly suppressed, in right-wing American individualism – in its demand for “freedom.”

Like an illusionist Trump plays with reality, producing an epistemological tumbledown. Already in the *Art of the Deal* published in 1987, he advocated what he called “hyberbole of facts” as a deal-making device and his advisor Kellyanne Conroy attempted to explain away his false accounts, exaggerations, and lies as alternate facts, ruffling conventional standards of veracity. Trump ignores his own production of false facts if indeed he does not con himself into believing them. It could be argued that he has conflated rhetoric – his rhetoric – with reference. Reference,

unlike rhetoric, is subject to truth conditional logic. Rhetoric is, as Socrates knew, prone to trickery. Persuasion substitutes for truth evaluation (even when “truth” figures rhetorically). This is not to say that rhetoric is simply persuasive, for it functions not only to convince but to subtly change the context and thereby the significance of the referential.

Trump is attracted to the unseemly, the less-than-legal, the swamp -- the corruptions -- he promised to do away with in his campaign, as has been dramatically revealed, as I write, by the judgments against his former campaign manager Paul Manafort and his lawyer-fixer Michael Cohen, incriminating him in their testimonies. He is drawn to autocratic leaders -- Putin, Kim Jong-un, Netanyahu, and Roderigo Duterte of the Philippines -- but will turn on them when it suits his purposes. The law and indeed the American constitution, which he has apparently never read, appear to be simply obstacles to achieving his goals. He does not seem to grasp the balance of powers and has tried again and again to interfere with the independence of the legislature and the judiciary. He has no qualms about breaking tradition, conventions and even the law. He refused -- and still refuses -- to reveal his tax returns, as presidents traditionally do; he asked to swear over his book, *The Art of the Deal*, instead of the Bible at his inauguration. (His request was refused.); he has withdrawn or threatened to withdraw security clearances from people whom he considers his enemies -- even President Obama -- solely on political grounds. His conduct at diplomatic and political meetings is malapert. He arrives late without an apology, pushes his way in front of other heads of state, interrupts them, mimics them, and has no concern for the appropriate etiquette as in his meeting the queen of England. He has refused to divest or put his businesses in fully blind trusts, and he promotes his own business interests at political and diplomatic meetings. His political speeches have little substance. Rather they are self-eulogizing rallies or occasions to vent his rage against whoever happens to be the “enemy” of the day. Even when his meetings are considered failures by their participants, he declares them great -- the greatest -- success ever -- and is wont to break whatever promises he made within hours. He arrives at them unprepared, without consulting experts, who he often mocks, for he knows best. His main source of news is Rupert Murdoch’s ultra-right Fox New, and he is said to depend primarily on one its commentator, Sean Hannity, for policy decisions as he depended at the begging on his presidency on the irascible alt-right Steve Brannon. Most of his political appointments are made on the basis of loyalty and their willingness to agree with whatever he says -- and not on expertise. If they do not, he fires them.

Like an illusionist he plays with reality. From the start of his presidency he has broken treaties,

ignored longstanding commitments, disrupted trade agreements that threaten the world economy, and the most fundamental moral values, as, for example, the separation from their parents of the children of banned immigrants. His responses are off-the cuff without any regard to their long-term consequences. His sense of the future is limited to near time, except presumably when it concerns his own everlasting fame.

19 I could, of course, continue to discuss Trump’s maneuvers, but then I would be participating in the effects he has produced. In fact, this lecture is inevitably such a response and should be heard in terms of both my argument and as a symptom of Trump’s effect on Americans like me. The effect is all-encompassing and therein lies its power. There is no-escape whether you support him or not. This inescapability is re-enforced by his modes of communication, most notably his tweets, which as I have said, do not invite a dialogical response. It is he – and he alone – who has the power to respond. When he does, his responses are rarely directed at the issue at stake but are simply further pronouncements, often self-eulogizing or attacks on his opponents even when they have nothing to do with the issue in question. Deflection is the rule.

Trump’s followers may find security in his style, as they may find comfort in God’s word. This would be especially true of the conservative evangelicals who are among his most ardent supporters, despite his blasphemous outbursts and his – in their eyes – sinful acts. I am not speaking here of Biblical allusions planted in many of George W. Bush’s speeches. If they occur in Trump’s, they are ornamental clichés. The evangelicals’ support of Trump is pragmatic and issue specific -- a means, for example, to end the right to abortion or stop immigrants (“terrorist and rapists” from) entering *their* country. It should not be dismissed as greed as many of his opponents suggest.

Mike Pence, the Christian fundamentalist vice-president, stands beside him at his signing legislation as a sort of totemic guarantor of the righteousness of -- or at least the necessity for -- whatever bill he is signing. His presence does not comfort to Trump’s opponents. Indeed, it inspires fear of his becoming president, which many consider worse than Trump’s presidency. This not to say that Trump’s supporters are not without their fears – fears of his impeachment.

His supporters do not seem to grasp the long-term consequences of his acts -- his denial of global warming; his arbitrarily breaking the Iran treaty without any concern for what it accomplishes or its effect on Middle Eastern politics; his tax cut on the poor, his Supreme Court

appointments; his reducing and redirecting funds for education and healthcare for whatever crackpot project (e.g. the border wall with Mexico) has entered his mind; his rescinding of environmental protection legislation; his warmongering; his trade-warring; his threats to end support for NATO, coupled with his veneration of Putin; and of course the effect of his acts on America's reputation and influence. That America First really means Trump First has become a cliché. It also marks the indifference and ignorance of much of the country to the rest of the world, as any reader of local newspapers or viewer of local television knows, except of course when it impinges directly their lives. And even then, many support Trump's policies that are not in their interests.

Whether it is intended or not, the conflict between the two positions produces a radical division in the country – one which gives little comfort to either side, for they both suffer from the lack of the communitarian sentiment of unity that nationalism inspires. This sentiment does not necessarily require agreement but the possibility of engagement. A deep-seated sense of isolation – a sort of loneliness – is coupled with anger and hostility. Family members who have different views of Trump avoid each other or vow not to let politics enter their relations. Friendships are broken, and there are fights in bars and political rallies that have led to killing. Trump's opponents argue that he has provoked them.

The range, intensity, and erratic quality of affect – what I am calling here affective anomie -- are enormous. There is little certainty. Each day Trump's acts unsettle the accommodations of the previous day. He offers no grounding. His unpredictability, his failure to follow traditional conventions, his hyperbole, his falsifying accounts of what happened, his lying, his about-faces, his dramatic shifts of mood, his rages, his personal attacks, his failure to give evidence for his pronouncements, his inability to engage in dialogue, his pretense – is it a pretense? – that he actually believes his pronouncement and the reality they imply preclude attributions of intention and a sense of an expectable future. And yet, attributions of intention are made and acted upon in terms of an expectable future. They require continual recalibration. There are certain positions he holds with tenacity, and yet he often acts in ways that undermine them. Uncertainty, mistrust, and doubt are pervasive, however strongly his supporters resist them. It may well account for their inflexibility and indeed that of his opponents whose opposition is solid and unyielding.

Each side has their own view of Trump – the one that he is a ruthless pragmatist whose indifference to tradition, convention, and even values they themselves hold demonstrate his

strength, courage and promise. The other insist the there is something wrong with him mentally. They throw out one or another diagnosis. He has been called narcissistic, paranoid, manic, delusional, a pathological liar, and schizophrenic, psychopathic, sociopathic, and just plain crazy. Some claim that he is suffering from ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) or ADD (attention deficit disorder), Asperger’s syndrome, the beginnings of Alzheimer’s disease or senile psychosis, or that he is addicted to cocaine. These diagnoses are bandied about without the requisite expertise and examination. They are defensive (as are many diagnoses), providing an illusory, external vantage point: an escape from Trump’s encompassing omnipresence and its dizzying effect. Whatever truth any of the diagnoses may have, they are essentially attempts to give order to disorder – to unreason. If affect is taken in temporal terms as promptitude -- a preconscious readiness to respond then we have to recognize that Trump’s frustrating manipulations give rise to heightened anxiety and unrealistic, erratic emotional responses that perpetuate that anxiety or surrender to often false hopes. He becomes for both his supporters and opponents a ground stone – a positive one for the one, a negative for the other.

What I want to stress by way of a conclusion is that unlike

the cognitive vertigo that Qandish and other curers produce and exploit in relatively defined, purposeful conditions, the dissonance that Trump produces is by no means so confined. His techniques may work in the narrow context of making a deal in a property transaction or in asking for a bank loan, but where the frame of reference is expansive, multi-resonant and multi-consequential, extending over time, such tactics are dangerous for not only do they affect the population at large, but Trump himself. He is not immune to the cognitive vertigo – the anomie – he has produced. He too must seek grounding – a stable vantage point. Perhaps this is one of reasons why he seems to be attracted to despotic leaders, why he clearly wants their unconstrained power. They or anyone he depends on becomes stabilizing other, which is of course impossible, for in surrendering to an other, in reality or in phantasy, he loses the very autonomy he desires. He has to destroy them. Danger lies here, for finally he is left to himself in the dizzying conditions he has created. How then, we have to ask, will he respond, knowing full well that we can’t answer this question with any certitude.



## “Sectarian Tension and Everyday Life: Case of Lebanon”

Akimitsu Ikeda (ILCAA)



Thank you. When I was preparing for today’s presentation, I was quite puzzled on symposium’s title, if it is possible at all to tell about “vertiginous realities,” and moreover, “vertiginous realities” as a topic under “affective studies.” I was worried like, if I pick up one Lebanese reality, describe it, and analyze it, and present it to you, like “Everyone, this is Lebanese vertiginous reality,” it is not vertiginous at all, because it is as if I grasped the vertiginous reality as a discrete entity and behaved as if I have authority to talk whatever I want. In this case, I am sure that I would not be able to convey any texture of being vertiginous to audience. So I felt I could not say anything for this symposium. Even though I felt honored to be entitled to speak in this symposium, I was wondering whether I should decline such an honor.

Then, one thing came up to my mind. It was about my classroom anthropology course for the second year students of undergraduate level. They were all anthropology major and I was supposed to teach them basic theories and major topics related to anthropology. It was the day that we were learning about fieldwork. I wanted to invite them to understand what fieldwork was like through descriptive writing rather than textbook’s-shortened teaching.

I have once published short articles on my fieldwork experience in Lebanon and I thought the short texts to be suitable for the students. I chose one of them and read it aloud, in front of the students. The content of the text is mostly same as my presentation today, by the way.

Now, among the students, there was a little bit older guy, who was once enrolled to economic department, but eventually gave it up, then got enrolled again to anthropology. Having realized what he really wanted to do, he showed enthusiasm in studying anthropology. I should say he was more than ordinary student and though he was still in the second year, he already started thinking about continuing his study in graduate school. When I finished reading my text, he immediately reacted and said to me, “Professor, I will never choose Lebanon as my fieldwork site. If I went there, I would definitely be mentally disordered.” Miserable Lebanon! She was quickly wiped out from this little anthropologist academic concern. I was trying to invite them to get familiarized to field work experience but the attempt was failed. However, maybe he was right. Now, it is time to think about vertiginous realities. I am not sure if the students’ experience can be called “vertiginous,” but at least if reading about Lebanon brought him such affective reactions,

including critical declaration, steep decline, I should say Lebanon at last got her proper occasion to be scrutinized under the title “vertiginous realities” or anthropology of affect. What I can do here is to enhance and exploit such occasion as much as possible.

Lebanon is characterized by its sectarianism and here, “sect” means social, these aspects of religion, and we are intending here, there is no such pejorative connotation for the word “sect.”

In Lebanon, there are 18 official sects of Islam and Christianity. I will not explain all of them, but let us just check there are Armenian sects here, like Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholic. I have to mention it later. You can say Armenian Orthodox is one of the sects in Lebanon like this.

Sectarian is power-sharing system institutionalized throughout modern history of Lebanon which means Late Ottoman, French mandate and post-war independence. Based on the frame, even they share, for example, evenly parliamentary seats among Christians or Muslims. Sometimes these systems worked well, especially when the modernization theory was evaluated, they considered Lebanon to be a good example of consociational democracy, but at the same time, there was malfunction of the system and it has led to conflicts or wars for these periods. Actually, around 2008, I was conducting my field work in Lebanon.

Among recent works, I picked up sectarianism studies based on constructionism. One famous example is historian, Ussama Makdisi’s case, but here I would choose Joanne Nucho’s work because she is an anthropologist. She regards sectarianism as a process, considering sectarianism to be social and cultural construction, which is created and re-created by people’s acts. She emphasizes such as relational, dialogic or negotiational aspects of sectarianism, rather than sectarianism as fixed entity.

The location where she conducted fieldwork is called Bourj Hammoud. It is an Armenian quarter, close to Beirut, which is the capital of Lebanon. Again, she regards Armenian community to be not only people, who belong to a shared sectarian category, but social and cultural construction by claiming.

Here, I just put one case from her book. It is about economic and medical service by NGOs and hospitals. These organizations were aiming mainly at Armenians, but she introduces the case of an Arab woman, who married with Armenian husband. She required aids for these organizations, by claiming her husband as Armenian. What happened on the side of these organizations is; based on Armenian family ideal, her claim was approved. They thought, even

though she was not Armenian, they should help her because women should be those who should do such work.

Based on these observations, she recognizes that there is interaction between individuals and organizations. It follows coordination by encapsulation. The organization encapsulates the woman and then, Armenian boundary is remade and eventually sectarianism was remade through this process.

From this argument, I understand that constructionism opened a framework that regards sectarianism to be maintained by everyday life or the present, especially the shifting present.

But from perspective of anthropology of affect, constructionism could be criticized because it has too much leaned towards the discursive. Scholars from this field distinguish emotion from affect, while emotion is discrete and linguistically-coded meanings, affect is like “energy” or “non- or pre-linguistic registers of experience.” “Its scope goes much beyond that of subjectivity or the self”. This phrase is quite difficult for me actually and another scholar says “if anthropologists of emotion throughout different compositions of language and the discourse, anthropologists of affect... sought to show how some feelings slip, evade, and overflow capture.”

Another one, anthropology affect is a “healthy reminder that human life is messier and more resistant to our efforts to make sense of it as social analysts than we might think” or “in place of the sheer critique of representation, affect added an affirmative critique that registers surprise at what and how things happen.” “Affect studies helped propel anthropology out of the mental habit of describing its objects as if they were fixed.”

Though I cannot do here theoretical criticisms from my own angle, I still agree with scholars’ aim to register experiences which is difficult to be figured but still important to grasp socially. Supposedly, many scholars found affect to be useful concept to renew anthropology.

From here, I would love to go into a description of my field. The place where I was doing fieldwork is called Kab Elias. In Lebanon, there is a valley called Bekaa. Kab Elias is situated in the Bekaa Plain. They say their population is about 50,000 and the characteristic in terms of sect is their diversity. About 50% of them are Sunni Muslims, whereas the rest of them consist of a few Christian sects. They are living together loose segregation and as for inter-marriage, it is quite difficult to judge, but I should say now it is not common.

. . .

Anyway, in this town, I was interested in what the form of sectarianism or boundary of sects in local situation in everyday lives is. How do people live sectarianism in their lives? In the following, I will show two cases. One is related to sect, but the other is not.

Case 1: one day I was watching TV with a Sunni couple and two sons. The TV was showing a Mass, probably of Greek Orthodox. Then, their son, about 4 years old, pointed out the screen by finger and said to me, “This is Christian.” His mother saw it and suddenly held his hand strongly and separated him from the television and she said to me, “Muslims and Christians are similar to each other.”

We can see, in this case, a consciousness on sectarian difference quite clearly and especially in verbal or bodily expression. They avert themselves from sectarian difference by comprehensive but vague expression like “similar to each other.” They reveal sectarian difference first but quickly deny it in the following moments. We might be tempted to see such phenomenon as something like strategy in order not to escalate the tension. It will be more so if, especially as I mentioned before, there was a sectarian tension around the period where I was living. But I would rather put question if it was really denied, because she said “similar” , but similar does not mean same or non-existence of the difference. I would like to say they appear to be denying the difference but actually imply it. What happened is sectarian difference eventually “remains” even though they try to hide it. Moreover, I would like to put another question. Did they do this because it was a matter of sect?

Now, I would like to continue to non-sectarian case. It is case 2. This one is about George, a Greek Orthodox old man. One day, his wife, two daughters and me were eating in the kitchen. While we were eating together in the kitchen, George came there and told me, “Give me your phone (i.e.mobile). I want to buy yoghurt from Paul.” Now Paul is Maronite Christian old guy. His job is to produce dairy products and he was my neighbor. When I heard George said to me like this, I felt something strange. Why does not he use home telephone because he is in his house? Even though I had my mobile on me, I replied, “No, I do not have it, but I will tell Paul about yoghurt on my way home,” because Paul was my neighbor, it was easy for me. I asked to George, “How much do you want it?”

Then, George raised his voice and said, “No, I do not want yoghurt! There is something and I

want to talk about it.” Looking at our interaction, his daughter amusedly said to me, “When my father mentions yoghurt, Paul will know what he is talking about. My father has his business.”

By her comment, I remembered George had told me he might sell an old refrigerator to Paul. I was wondering if this George’s attitude was related to the plan, but I was not sure. Anyway his communication style was vague, and I was curious and wanted to know if such style was common in the town or in Lebanon generally. I asked, “Why did he behave like that?” to his daughter. Then, she withdrew her gaze from me and said, “I do not know. I just thought like that, that is it.” She did not expand her comment anymore and drank a shot glass of liqueur made from grapes and kept silence.

A few days later, what happened is Paul bought old refrigerator from George.

Now, about this case, the intention of George’s behavior is eventually, most probably, transaction of refrigerator, but I would love to continue my argument. We can say it is similar to case 1 because both cases reveal, then hide something. If it is valid to say that similarity of interaction through both sect-related matter and non-sect-related matter can be observed. Also, what they revealed still “remains” even after they tried to hide it.

At first, daughter revealed the intention of her father’s behavior. Then she said “I do not know” but it does not mean she does not know his intention, but she just restricted her comments as her personal thought. Then, that she knew his intention still “remains,” even though she tried to hide it.

Based on this observation in the field, I would like to remark some concluding points.

The first one: when we go back to Nucho’s constructionist analysis, what she was arguing is, by claiming people make themselves engaged in sectarianism, while in my case, people make themselves disengaged in sectarianism but still maintain its space.

As we saw here, I made my argument based on people’s, let us say, “affective response” towards me. I am tempted to say sectarianism is affective. What we are seeing is Lebanon’s affective sectarianism, but more importantly, I would love to continue argument, if such behavior extends beyond sectarian matters, their core of life-world could be different from scholar’s attention or excessive attention to sectarianism. Then, we might be able to say ethnographic description with an emphasis on affect helps us to explore what we really should focus on in order to do anthropology based on truly other’s point of view.

## International Symposium“Coping with Vertiginous Realities”

(Nishii) Thank you very much, we are glad to listen to your meticulous research, it shows new orientation of anthropology.

Thank you, again.

<Break>

(Nishii) Now I invite Professor Kazuyoshi Sugawara to give a speech titled “Enacting the Past Incidents in a Non-Literate Society.”

**“Enacting the Past Incidents in a Non-Literate Society: Tripartite Interaction among the G|ui Narrators, Research Assistants, and an Anthropologist in Central Kalahari”**

**Kazuyoshi Sugawara (Kyoto University)**



Good afternoon. This is an honorable experience for me to present my paper in the presence of great professor Vincent Crapanzano. Other than the abstract, though some people might say it is too much self presentation, I prepared four kinds of handout; three are my recent articles already published that are relevant for today’s presentation, the fourth is a full paper on which this presentation is based. Then, let us begin.

Let me depart from a private memory of the morning of one day in middle of March 1968. On the day before, I failed on the entrance exam of the University of Tokyo. At the breakfast table, my father was in a bad mood; my difficult brother, 8 years elder than I, complained about the taste of mother’s cooking. Father got angry and quarreled with him.

In January 2013, 18 years after father’s death, I had an opportunity to stay at my brother’s home. When we enjoyed the stories of our youth, I was astonished to find him in complete oblivion regarding this episode. However, from the youth to the present, he has stayed in the habit of making daily entries in his diary. If there had been no diary, I could never be certain whether my memory corresponded to what actually had happened nearly half a century ago or it was merely a delusion.

At least in pre-modernity, a claim that a certain incident had actually occurred at a certain point of time could be confirmed only by connecting this claim with the communication system based on letters (literacy). Illiterate societies generally lack decisive materials providing evidence for the reality of any past incident.

If so, we can assume polar extremes in the interpretation of oral discourse concerning the past incidents:

A) The singular past really existed. The accuracy of narrative for mapping an incident to the discourse world depends on the narrator’s faculty of memorizing. The higher this faculty is, the

more faithful the narrative to the singular past incident.

B) The past does not really exist. People being motivated to tell all the past incidents merely transformed some mental resource that has *little* relation with the reality into oral language. In illiterate societies, any attempt to reconstruct the real “history” with objective accuracy is destined to be in vain.


I will commit myself to neither view. The purpose of the following argument is to cut a narrow path between them.

Some of the advocators for the embodiment theory in cognitive science inheriting Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s contemplation proposed the “enactive approach,” that regards perception/cognition as a simultaneous “enaction” both of the subject and the world through embodied action. The key term for this presentation, enact, enactive, and enaction, derived from this school of thought.

Edmund Husserl, the predecessor of Merleau-Pontian thought, argued that all that is presented to us in flesh-and-blood and vivid reality must be directly accepted in just the same way as it gives itself. I would like to express this characterization of reality with a rather awkward term “fresh-vividness.”

Trying to fill up my description with fresh-vividness, I would like to propose rather a curious perspective: to comprehend narrative as a kind of bodily activity of walking on the mosaic-like boundary between environment and virtual environment.

I only show a figure omitting the explanation.




The point is the interpenetration between these two environments. Since 1982 I have conducted research among the G|ui Southern African hunter gatherers. From 1994 to 2013, I recorded the narratives that were told primarily by elderly G|ui group members. Here, I want to reveal some characteristics of the interactive sequence in which the narrator, the investigator, namely me, and the research assistants had participated.

The G|ui and another dialect group, G||ana, in close linguistic affinity with G|ui, lived a nomadic lifestyle dependent on nearly self-sufficient hunting-gathering economy in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR).

The basis of the subsistence was primarily supported by the gathering activities of women.


Using traditional bow-and-arrow hunting, the most commonly taken game were seven species of large and medium-sized ungulates called “things to eat (qχ’óō-χó).”

After 1979, the G|ui/G||ana became settled as part of the government’s Remote Area Developmental Program and the Xade settlement of between 500 and 600 people was born at the western edge of the reserve. They were forced to relocate when the government initiated its Relocation Program in 1997 and today, over 1,000 people are living in the settlement of Qx’oensakene, official term \*New Xade.



The following linguistic knowledge owes much to Professor Hiroshi Nakagawa’s thorough phonological studies on G|ui, who is the professor of this university, the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Personal Pronoun System constitutes almost a complete paradigm.



In this presentation, eight segments are picked out from the transcriptions of utterances recorded in “artificial setting of interview” with six G|ui men who were in or above their 60s. As for the “artificial setting of interview,” please consult the paper in 2013 handout. Two survey assistants, Thabuuka (TB) and Kaaka (KA) played important roles in interview.

Generally, interview is a peculiar form of verbal interaction in which an investigator (Iv) wants to obtain novel knowledge or information from a native person (X). This initial condition naturally results in an adjacent pairing of Iv’s inquiry and X’s response.

*Is the Q & A the Elementary Form of Interview?*

**Segment 1 (20/07/98)**

HO2: ((preceding utterances omitted)) *Eh*, the government still talk much. It is said that we will migrate again.

Iv3: *Eeh!*? Where?=

HO3: =To g!áẽ-†χai.((steenbok-eye))

Iv4: To new--new land?

HO4: To new land.

Iv5: Again?

HO5: Again.

Iv6: Why?

HO6: This--this place is near *geimreseifesi* ((modified form of “game reserve”). [[IV: *Ehe?*]]

((succeeding utterances omitted))

In Segment one, the narrator, HO, was an influential man who had assisted the chief of the Xade settlement. One year after the relocation was enforced, I asked him about the recent circumstances at the relocated village. The exchange of speech turns from Iv3 to HO6 embodies a conspicuous sequence that consists of the chain of adjacency pairs of inquiry and response. This is the ideal type. However, this is far from “narrative.”

In 1994, at the beginning the trial of collecting the “life-histories” from elder people, I tried to induce the informant to the Q&A sequence. However, soon I found it a boring project because by using such a method, I could not encounter the G|ui’s “long talk” that had fascinated me when I had been analyzing their everyday conversation in previous years. Thus, I decided to yield the initiative of interviewing to the survey assistants. All the following segments are the product of the interviews that were carried out after this decision.

### *Shared Knowledge Supporting the Routine Works*

#### **Segment 3 (26/09/'96)**

((preceding utterances omitted))

KA1: “It is g!áē((steenbok))’s calf.”

NK3: (Taking the g!áē’s calf, they(c/pl) cook it.) You then [take] things(f/pl) you eat. You, namely, cook and cook those little qχ’óōχò((thing to eat)), while the wife are doing over there. If there is a g!āī((redcrested korhaan)), [she] takes off its legs.

KA2: You have just killed it together with tsám̄bà((genet)).

NK4: Killing it together with tsám̄bà(f/pl). [You] killed and throw away these(f/pl).

KA3: *Eeh?*

NK5: *Nh*, throw away them.

KA4: They have the sweet meat, but...

NK6: *Nh*. ((Laugh)) [You] throw away and dump.[...] Hey, when you kill the tsám̄bà, you throw away [it]. [You] never approach near it.


KA5: You might go ahead and kill [another things]. Because its(m/sg) blood stains them, in order not to let your wife eat [the stained meat, you throw away the genet].

NK7: *Nh*, you dislike it.. ((succeeding utterances omitted))

Over the long turn NK1 (in the paper), omitted from this slide, the narrator described the mundane activity of snare-hunting that was denoted by rather a vague verb “gather (!ʔoð).” The most interesting sequence can be observed in turns succeeding KA3, in which KA expressed his surprise. The characteristic relevance for this sequence is that a distinctive difference between the sexes and ages is found in the “eating rate” for the species of the ηʔii-|òà (tentatively translated as “beast”) category, which approximately corresponds to the biological taxon of carnivores.

All women, as well as juveniles, except those in the eldest grade, consistently avoided them, while the men’s eating rates are due to a wide variation in the males’ accounts of what animal to avoid. As many as 44% of married men eat genet (tsám̄bà), while NK regards it as his η!āā-χò; things which will cause the disease if consumed. KA believes that the genet meat is good-tasted

and is surprised with NK’s aversion to it. However, in KA5, he tried to re-interpret this aversion as a sign of NK’s care for his wife and children, who might be harmed by eating their favorite meat that had been stained with blood of genet. Essential difference in the vulnerability to animal meat between men, women, and juveniles, is enacted here.



The socio-cultural background of Segment 4 is intricate. According to the narratives by several elder men, until about half a century ago, especially when there were not enough women eligible for marriage in their own camp, they had sometimes participated in an all-male team that raided a distant camp for its women. CM described in detail a case of these violent projects. At that time, he had already been married with !?Ono, whose younger brother Kare participated in the raiding team. Kare kidnapped two women, taking them forcefully to a camp where CM and his wife had visited and stayed. Two husbands of the two kidnapped women had secretly followed the raiders in order to get back their wives.

### *Coordination on Mosaic-like Boundary*

#### **Segment 4 (29/10/’94)**

((preceding utterances omitted))

TB2: Behind the hut?

CM6: Near behind the hut. [...] [He thought,] “O! You might stab another man.” So [he] thought. It was dark.

KA5: It was dark!

CM7: And then we(c/pl) were doing this and that. The *hour* is—if I knew the *hours* you(m/pl) use, I’d say on such *hours*. Coming, I sat.

KA6: In the twilight?

CM8: *E~e*. When it was pitch-dark. [Saying,] “Let us go to bed,” that’s when we sleep.

KA7: Maybe, it might be at about nine o’clock.

CM9: *Ehei ! Ehei !* It’s at about nine o’clock. In that way, we(c/pl) were sitting, we sat, while they two(f/dl) passed by, (-) at the distance like that lqχ’òà ((a kind of *Acacia* tree)), they two(f/dl) sat, and drew the qâà melon [from the ash]. Oh! at that time he came on all fours, and lied down there. Their(f/dl) husband!

KA8: *Eheei*, like [at the distance] where that short lqχ’òà stands!

((succeeding utterances omitted))

Two important features should be framed up. First, CM described in CM6 that the deprived husband, who had stalked to the camp, had been sitting as far away as the investigator’s video camera that was standing on the tripod. Similarly, in CM9, it was stated that the kidnapped two women had been sitting at the distance like that *lqχ’óà* (a kind of acacia). These expressions illuminated the way how the here-and-now environment and the virtual environment, that is, the past event, are contiguous with each other on the mosaic-like boundary.

Second, the sequence extending over five turns, CM7-KA6-CM8-KA7-CM9, is striking. Here, CM and KA are negotiating with each other to estimate the hour on which the deprived husband had been just stalking. In fact, “hour” in transcription is the translation of *naakò*, a loan word from Setswana. As G|ui lacks the word that corresponds to “time” in English, in everyday discourse, the G|ui of the older generation have never referred to the time itself as an abstract concept. Their cognition of time is based on an elaborate tense marker system in G|ui that strictly corresponds to the solar movement. On the other hand, those in younger generation have adapted to the “temporalized system” in Niklas Luhmann’s term from their experience with wage labor. Here, the narrator tried to enhance the reality of the past incident he was narrating, by connecting the local or oral communication system with the temporalized system. It was not until the young assistant KA behaved quite cooperatively with the senior narrator that the latter’s attempt was successfully attained.

Most people whom I begged for the narrative were willing to accept my request. The following example is an exceptional case in which the narrator, at first, showed a reluctant attitude. The narrator, PR, was the oldest man in my host camp. Since about 1987, I had noticed that probably owing to the cataract, his eyes were becoming clouded. In 1990, when I was absent at Xade, I received news that PR completely lost his eyesight. This segment was recorded 6 years later.

### *Reluctance and Spontaneity*

#### **Segment 5 (03/09/’96)**

TB1: *Eheei, Aa*, When you were a child, the *lʰàù(f/pl)* ((the game for snares) that you went out and killed, those that you chased and killed, [...]) or those that you shot with the arrow, about those things(*f/pl*) *we(m/dl)* beg you; such narratives.

(++)

PR1: I did?

TB2: *Aeh*, when you were still a child, when you had the eyes,

{You beat the calf of *lχóò* ((*gembok*)) or the *ŋ!oa* ((*bush duiker*)), didn’t you?}

PR2: {You(m/dl)—dear me!—might beg me them(*f/pl*) }

TB3: *Aii*

PR3: Dear me! I’ve supposed—that they(*m/pl*) are talking to him ((PR’s younger brother-in-law)). If there were the light in my eyes and I could see well, I could take out them(*f/pl*), but the light vanished.

TB4: You might know them in your heart.

PR4: I know them in my heart. But, as the light vanished, I cannot ‘bring my face’(=make sure of) and take out them well. [[TB: *Nnh*]] *Nh*.

TB5: Mouth—Tell [them] only with your mouth.

PR5: When I was a child [[TB: *Nh*]] [I] went gathering. And [I] went hunting.

Far away. ((succeeding utterances omitted))

In PR3 and PR4, PR himself plainly attributed his reluctance to narrate to his lost eyesight. TB’s view concerning narrative seems to coincide with our common sense—even those people with no eyesight can scan their memories stocked in their mind with the “mind-eye.” However, after analyzing the conspicuous sequence of interaction between CM and KA in Segment 4, I recognized that such a common sense view of narrative missed an important point. For the G!ui, the rhetorical device of overlapping the sense of distance between the narrator and some object in the landscape visible in here-and-now context with what was experienced in the past incident is essential resource for enacting their own world. The narrative is not merely an activity to talk with “only one’s mouth” of what one “knows in her/his heart.”

The G!ui men held their male initiation rituals in the past. That has never been observed for nearly half a century, since the last initiation ceremony was held early in the 1970s. This ritual is called !hórōχà, while another term lùī, which is synonymous with !hórōχà, is often used, originally meaning “the song of men.” TB had told me that PR, his uncle, knew lùī very well. The incipient purpose of the second interview with PR was to record the “song of men.”

<VTR>

Sorry, this visual image does not correspond to this segment, but at just the beginning of the interview. After PR sang, a very complicated negotiation between the assistants and the narrator about the authenticity of this song occurred. The research assistant of the younger generation knows Setswana language, agro-pastoralist language, so he quickly supposed that this song had originated from the agro-pastoralists, but PR showed a very unpleasant facial expression and claimed that this was truly the lùī song, etcetera. I had already wrote about this interesting negotiation, in an article that was published in 2008, but it is not easy for you to get this article. If you want, please contact with me, I will send the PDF file.

KA was really absorbed in the past event that was enacted with such fresh/vividness, and honestly expressed his longing for the past event. “I wonder if I could have been there!”

## *Entrainment and Absorption*

### **Segment 6a (17/09/'99)**

PR1: ((preceding song omitted)) ♪*Tsuipaabu raoka* (++) [[KA: *Nh*]]

TB1: And {broke off. } And, stopped.

KA1: {And end up it(*m/sg*). }

That's the way of *lii* ((ritual)). It was wonderful. [I] wonder I could have been there ((TB: Laugh)). If so, I would be in nice heart. ((TB/Iv: Laugh))

### **Segment 6b**

PR1: When we were lying in this way, [the elder men themselves] came carrying [a bowl of] porridge on their heads, and took off the goods. We all ate them(*f/p*). Eating, eating, eating them, and then, they—they took us out and sang the *lii*'s song of [praising] the *lii* for our gathering.

♪*Aeh Aeh Aeh*. Thus [they] sang, and then we went gathering.

KA2: *Ahahahahao* ((Laugh)). I could have been there! *A?*!

The knowledge of magic and sorcery had been certainly imported from the *ṭébè* (Kgalagadi agro-pastoralist) culture of Bantu origin. KK in the following segment was an influential man from the background of intermarriage between *ṭébè* and Kua, generic term of Bushmen, and KK was handicapped. His right knee was in complete paralysis. I attempted to ask how he had become handicapped.

## *Idiom and the Reality*

### **Segment 7 (26/08/'96)**

KK3: [.....] [[Iv: *Nh*]] Just then, I fell in the disease. [[Iv: *Nh*]] *Eei*.

Iv2: *E?*--but, who made the sorcery over you?

KK4: *Nh*, Nakuridzane made the sorcery over me.

Iv3: His name?

KK5: *Ehee*, his name.

Iv4: Is he *ṭébè* ((Kgalagadi agro-pastoralist)) man?

KK6: *Uh*, *ṭébè* woman.

Iv5: [Is the person] *ṭébè* woman?

KK7: *Uh*, *ṭébè* woman.

Iv6: Why?

KK8: I don't know her method. She merely might [have hoped to] marry me, and therefore have been mortified [that she couldn't acquire] me, and have made the sorcery over me. Thus, the divination said. [[Iv: *Nh*]] *Eei*, [the diviner] cast the pieces, and said, "She was mortified [that she could not] marry you, and made the sorcery over you." [[Iv: *Ahahi*]] "And [she had] killed you." *Eei*. [[Iv: *Hah*]] Then, [she had] killed me. [[Iv: *Ehee*]] [However,] the *glama* (*m/sg*) ((god-spirit)) spat me out. [He] refused me. [[Iv: *Ah*]] *Ehee*.((succeeding utterances omitted))

KK's narratives in KK3, KK4 and KK8 were organized in accordance with a specific "idiom" in Crapanzano's term, namely, sorcery ( $\eta\lambda\hat{\alpha}\hat{\alpha}'\chi\hat{\alpha}\hat{\epsilon}$ ). This idiom confronts in a peculiar way the investigator's attempt to approach past incidents through narrative. The act of harming a person by sorcery is usually unobservable. The statement that the victim was actually harmed by the sorcerer thus describes invisible agents. Even though this causation assumes incomparable fresh/vividness for the narrator, it is difficult for the investigator to share this fresh/vividness. Therefore, such a statement is posited in especially isolated space in the virtual environment as a

token of the narrator’s interpretation of the world.

However, such an epistemological isolation does not necessarily mean that the relevance of indigenous interpretation of reality is completely cut off. The sequence from KK3 to KK8 expanded my understanding of the semantic field of the transitive verb *ηluo*, which is frequently used in everyday discourse. Until recording KK’s narrative, I had simply translated this word into “regret X (that was lost)” or “be envious of X (owed by the other). However, Narikudzane had loved KK, but her seduction was refused. Namely, *she was mortified at failing to get the object of desire, namely X.*

Thereafter, I gradually understood that *ηluo* was the key concept for understanding the social conflict among the *G|ui* that was mostly driven by jealousy and envy. Comprehending the “inferential structure” underlying an idiom, or an interpretation of the world, casts light onto the social attitude lived by the people, as being-in-the (real)-world.

Although NK is the same narrators in segment three, the following segment had been recorded two years earlier. Ci is NK’s wife and played a critical role in the interaction.

*Oblivion vs. the Intensity of the Virtual Environment*

**Segment 8 (02/10/’94)**

NK1: I never *dzãã* with such a woman,[.....], then I returned and sit down,  
and have kept sitting all the time.

Ci1: He--he —Hey! KA!— tells a lie.

KA2: He must have a lover. With that woman...

Ci2: In this way. After throwing away *Teëtsoo*—there was a woman *G+aa* who  
used to sit limply, whose daughter was *‡hereqχ’oaxo*—he took her and had  
lived with her.

Iv1: *E?* Suusera’s sister? *Eheei*, Suusera’s![.....]

Ci4: She is the daughter—*‡hereqχ’oaxo*’s. He took another woman!

NK3: Just that woman, I returned [to home] and took!

KA3: *Eheei*, [Iv] previously wrote her name!

NK4: *Aii*, you(m/pl) wrote it?

KA4: We(m/pl) know her name! But you hide it, don’t you?

NK5: *E~e*, I’m not hiding! Being forgetful of it, I have lived((Laugh)). Being  
forgetful of it, I have lived! *mama e!*, *Ehehehehehe*((Laugh)). Sure, I took that  
woman. That woman, *baaba!*, I took, and she held a boy there((in her womb)).

Ci5: His child was a boy. ((succeeding passages omitted))

Generally, the narrators sometimes hide their own acts in the past. Oblivion is the most effective potential that leads to unintentional concealment. However, at a scene, where the narrative is developed, there are sometimes bystanders, who regard the narrators’ oblivion as lies, being endowed with the competence to reveal the “truth.” The narrator’s spouse is the most representative of the bystanders with such competence. In this segment, we are tempted to infer that NK’s concealment was not deliberate but arose from genuine oblivion, especially from his laughter in NK5 that made it sound as if he was really amused by his own recalling. Oblivion is a specific process through which stigmatic information is concealed by a natural consequence at the

level of existential choice, as is discussed by Jean-Paul Sartre, outside the deliberate control of the subject.

A bystander's intervening can certainly transform the narrator's forgetfulness into recollection. In such a moment, the intensity of virtual environment is enhanced at a stroke. This process itself heightens the reliability of the following statement. The chain of incidents really existed in which the narrator was living with a woman named ≠here≠qx'oaxo, fathered a boy with her, and threw away them.

### *Cooperative Enaction* Segment 9 (15/09/'00)

GS4: I visited. For a moment. Came to sit down. Then, I felt very thirsty.

Therefore, η||ãñ ((wild water melon)), I [begged]

TB5: [You] begged.

GS5: η||ãñ, therefore I begged. She turned to the η||ãñ and took up it. And she in this way put her thigh—Oh dear!—I--in contact with it((her thigh)) I put mine((my thigh)). She pierced [the η||ãñ with a digging stick] to cut off [its] top, and then....

TB6: [She] pounded [the sarcocarp] out softly.

GS6: Putting [the digging stick] within [the cut melon] to crush [the sarcocarp] and then...

TB7: Pounded out softly.

GS7: Softly, she pounded out, softly.

TB8: You, during that time, were sitting.

GS8: [I] thought, "A? ! You(m/pl)! ((interjection)) Nh?"

TB9: She—whatsoever!?

GS9: Whatsoever she [intends]!? What [is it that] only you are sitting side by side with her! A? ! You(m/pl)! ((interjection)) What [is it that] only you are sitting side by side with her! Whatsoever!?

The last segment is a typical case that impressed me with the interactive significance of an intimacy between the narrator and the survey assistant. The narrator GS was famous as a master of dzáákù, namely, extra-marital sexual relationship that is quite ordinary among the G|ui and G||ana society. GS had married two women and had dzáákù relationships with at least five women. When he was living his first wife ≠Qai, he loved a girl, Tseeha, who had not yet experienced menarche. In the following segment, he described in detail how he had fallen in love with that girl.

This sequence makes us confident that the memory of the past incidents in which the narrator had loved a young girl is not a text-like mental representation that had remained intact in his "brain." The glorious experience could be enacted in the here-and-now context only through astonishingly cooperative responses by a listener of the younger generation. Thus, the past cannot be *re-presented* solely by the narrator's monologue. It emerges from the interaction between the narrator and the listener, that is, from the *co-enaction*.

After the publication of *Tuhami*, no anthropologists, who had concentrated their attentions on to the narrative as the most promising path to the different form of life from their own, cannot dispense with the legacy from Vincent Crapanzano, who had pioneered the phenomenological approach to dialogical interaction perse between narrator and anthropologist. I have approached the narrative along a slightly different path. For me, following Husserlian maxim, “Return to the things themselves” was to return to the face-to-face interactions in the tripartite relation among the narrator, research assistants, and me. This attempt is an indispensable step towards demonstrating that the ethnography based on narrative is not an outcome of disembodied mental representation but has emerged from the ensemble of a huge number of embodied actions—or cooperative practices.

In conclusion, I have to return to the extreme poles in interpretation of narrative. It is evident that most of above analyses are contrary to “assumption A.” Even a fantastic story-teller like CM was encouraged by the cooperation of an assistant of the younger generation. Above all, this realist, as well as representationalist, stance has no means to understand the interactive significance of oblivion.

On the other hand, the agnosticism characterizing the “assumption B” flatly contradicts with the experience of fieldwork. As soon as an anthropologist decides to go to Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Kalahari Desert, or wherever, the travel has already begun. This travel is fundamentally motivated by the incipient fascination from the other’s form of life. We cannot perceive the ‘old things,’ but we can continue walking on the mosaic-like boundary between environment in the here-and-now context and the virtual environment we call the “past.” An anthropologist can, through immediate co-presence with the co-enaction between narrators and the listeners, enhance the intensity of the virtual environment.

Finally, we have to pay special attention to the body on which all the existences anchor themselves in the world. The paralysis of KK’s right leg constitutes undoubtable reality. His narrative can reveal the past causation chin, even if the anthropologists cannot believe in such invisible agency as sorcery. The undeniable perception that some people have of physical features that are similar to those of the Bantu cannot be explicable, unless we believe in the actual incidence of inter-marriage in old days. Concerning this point, sexuality has a privileged status for us to comprehend all the living existences as the consequence of reproductive chain. When anthropologists keep listening to multiple discourses accompanied with pleasurable, and sometimes unpleasant, expressive gestures shown by narrators, they can trace intricate networks that connect one incident with another, from love affair to violence. Thus, the density of virtual environment is enhanced.

Thank you for your attention.

(Nishii) Thank you very much. From your speech, now, we understand maybe all anthropologists here in Japan, everybody has our own Vincent Crapanzano inside us. Thank you.

Now we will have 10 minutes break. Please come back here at 3:40.

<Break>

(Nishii) Now, we would like to start the third session. Next speaker is Professor Akira Okazaki; “Accommodating nightmares: how to cope with anxieties in a Sudanese refugee community.”

## “Accommodating Nightmares: How to Cope with Anxieties in a Sudanese Refugee Community”

Akira Okazaki (ILCAA)



Good afternoon everyone. I am very glad to have this symposium with Professor Vincent Crapanzano. This symposium has a bit strange title, “Coping with Vertiginous Realities.” In fact, I proposed this title when we were preparing this symposium because the paper sent by Professor Crapanzano has this sort of argument about vertiginous realities. Then, I started to think, in my case what kind of my fieldwork experience I can talk as a vertiginous reality. I found it: that is, dreams and tricksters.

My paper is concerned with the way the Gamk people of Sudan try to cope with anxieties caused by nightmares, but I also try to show a possibility of using the Gamk way of coping with nightmares for rethinking the anxieties and anomy produced by Donald Trump.

Now, I want to make clear, there are two kinds of “nightmares”: One is bad ominous dreams, like omen, and second one is crazy fools. Both are called *caalk* in Gamk language. Indeed, this terminology is very odd and confusing. That is, dreams and fools (human) are referred to by the same Gamk term *caalk*. I also have to emphasize that in this community, dreams are not regarded as internally produced mental sensations within the self as suggested by Western psychology. But dreams are what the human Shadow experiences when it is away from the sleeping host.

For them, dream has nothing to do with personal pleasure. On the contrary, they say, they disliked dreams because they are troublesome. People even try not to sleep during daytime since it is more likely to be threatened by ominous dreams. Nevertheless, dreams are important because they reveal in a special way what is really going on in the world (for example, a state of civil war or a current situation of refugees’ original home). Also, dreams reveal what is really going on among the people’s moral imagination (for example, hidden moral ambiguity, present inchoate anxiety, seduction of riches, erotic desires, unsettled quarrel or bitter remorse). So people cannot easily ignore nightmares. Accordingly, people are often impelled to “repair” the situation by means of healing rituals. It is also through nightmares that the living and the dead can communicate with each other. The dreamer is expected to recount dream contents seriously in

public since they may include socially important or dangerous event going in the Shadow space/time. It is called *ok ta kuuth*. That is a world invisible during daylight but existing there. There are always people around and ready to listen to and seriously comment on other people's dream narratives.

Let me briefly talk about the notion of *kuuth*, "the Shadow." It is used in various ways the human Shadow and the people in Shadow that means ancestors or the world in Shadow. But in principle, the term is used as a metaphor of an invisible or hidden aspect of the world, human, thing, and matter. First of all, the Shadow is associated with living human person. Although, it is not intrinsic to the human being (as this shadow is brought to a new-born baby from under the tree), the Shadow is essential to human health. If it is lost, the host person will fall ill. The shadow is also essential because it reveals in ominous dreams an important aspect of the world, which tend to elude one's attention. But one cannot control one's Shadow, as one cannot dream by one's own will. In other words, the Shadow is vital because it is not under the control of host, but beyond the control. In other words, Shadow is vital because it is not as an integral part of the self but as "the stranger within."

Now, let me talk about details of another *caalk* that is crazy fools. They are usually seen as pleasant and happy people. They are fond of dance, music, and obscene songs. They are lazy and roam villages like a mob looking for free meals, beer, women while disseminating jokes and laughter around the village. But at the same time, they are untrustworthy, too capricious, out of control, greedy. They even steal other people belongings and ignore what is generally considered sexual decency. This is why both nightmares and crazy fools are often described as 'nam ok' (eat people, metaphorical meaning of threatening); in other word, both dreams and crazy fools are described in the same way. By the way, please mind, from now on, some similarities between the crazy fools and Donald Trump.

They are threatening and yet villagers accept their conduct because what they do could or should be taken as a kind of play. So, on the other hand, they, *caalk*, are much liked by villagers. They make people laugh through jokes and jocular play. However, it should be emphasized that their "play" is not something that is only "permitted" on, or "prescribed" for ritual or formal occasions. In everyday settings, *caalk* continue to do quite freely what ordinary villagers just do not or should not do.

*Caalk*, crazy fools cause laughter and make people happy. This is not because they are witty, wise, shrewd or cunning, but because they are amusing, funny, whimsical, prankish, absurd and foolish. They really make witty remarks or verbal jokes that might otherwise indicate how clever they are. In fact, they can be talkative and sometimes talk ceaselessly, but people say that they

mostly speak “nonsense.” Because of their incessant nonsense talk, I have never been able to enter into any serious discussion with these fools. And I doubt if any villagers ever have. [To audience] I am talking about jokers, but here people are very serious.!

[followed by modest laughter].

Not surprisingly, *caalk* are never involved in local politics, of course. But from a certain perspective, they are very political. While their “nonsense language” is outside local politics, they can “argue” through songs. Many of them are lucid singer-song-makers and lyre players. Crazy fools can make up new songs mainly about scandals around the village such as love affairs, extramarital relations, quarrels, misfortunes, marriage troubles, frightening events, the taste of local beer, strange animals, mysterious phenomena, new fashions, and trouble with foreigners, such as traders or government people. In such a song, they ridicule or make fun of specific, always named, person, but people insist that such a person will never complain about and may even be pleased about such a song. That is to say, fools are able to comment on anyone’s conduct without offending him or her. Such social comments serve to criticize openly the arrogance or insensitivity of certain persons as well as to disseminate news like a local newspaper. Sometimes, the song itself serves to reconcile two parties in conflict with one another.

Another way in which *caalk* can be political is through miming. Unlike a jester, *caalk* say little, but can ridicule elders, seers (diviners) or any person in authority just by imitating how they behave. Usually, they do not exaggerate gestures, but simply and often quite accurately imitate them. For example, he approaches the elder, who is delivering a serious address at a meeting, from behind and mimes his gesture with a serious look. For example, let me show you now [the speaker, Okazaki, moved to Prof Crapanzano’s rear and mined his move]. That elder cannot see *caalk*, but people in front of the elder can see both the elders and *caalk*. But people try not to laugh because elders are very authoritative. Likewise, at the end of the rite for twins, they usually imitate the diviner’s conventional technique for healing. That is picking invisible seeds from the patient’s bodily parts in shamanistic fashion. What they are doing is not healing but nonsense and people know that. But the more accurate detailed the mime is, the more it assumes a satirical effect about the technique and the more it provokes onlookers to burst into laughter. At such a moment, I always wondered whether the villagers are really taking the healing power of the diviner seriously.

It seems unlikely that these crazy fools intend, when miming, to defy or rebel against authorities. They simply enjoy provoking laughter. Likewise, it seems unlikely that those imitated by them will cease to do what had been ridiculed. Moreover, their act over transgression may be frivolous because it may well serve to reinforce, rather than undermine, what is considered

morally correct conduct. Nevertheless, their play can create an ambiguous situation in which “serious” “authoritative” and “trustworthy” conduct suddenly seems comical and funny. Thus, these fools enable people to suspend the taken-for-grant world and see themselves, their social values, their conventional forms of life and authorities from a different perspective. In short, they provoke de-familiarizing effect.

Here, I would like to make three remarks about *caalk* in relation to the Shadow and nightmares. First, although these fools may provoke people to appreciate something, they do so not by showing clearly or speaking plainly but by putting people in a state of confusion and puzzlement, as in a state of the Shadow. Eventually, the ambiguities, uncertainties, wonder and fascination provoked by them enable people to appreciate something as well as to revitalize everyday life. What is experienced here is something that can only indirectly be appreciated, as in the case of poem and metaphor. Second, such a de-familiarizing effect is not created by crazy fool’s intentions or with people’s conscious efforts but it occurred rather involuntarily. The familiar can only be dislocated by accident, as by nightmares. Third, such a moment or insight occurs only transiently and even fugitively as if in a state of the Shadow.. It hardly lasts for more than a fleeting moment. In sum, all these remarks indicate how elusive the experience of de-familiarization is.

To explore this kind of elusive experience further, let me discuss briefly interesting similarities between a trickster and the anthropologist. Crapanzano discussed such issues several times: for example, his chapter ‘Hermes’ Dilemma’ in “Writing Culture” (1986) and his book “Hermes’ Dilemma & Hamlet’s Desire: On the Epistemology of Interpretation” (1992). I quote from his 1992 ‘Introduction’: “Hermes was a messenger and a trickster. I liken the anthropologist to him. All truly informative messages have a puckish dimension that jolts us from our ordinary expectations. (...). He must disrupt the prejudice and pre-understandings of his interlocutor and break the frames in which these prejudices and pre-understanding are held. Paradoxically, the messengers must first create disbelief and then destroy it without destroying anguish and concern the disbelief triggered, for without anguish and concern the message cannot be heard.”

Many anthropologists have also indicated similarities between anthropological practice and tricksters’ or clowns’ activities : for example, Yamaguchi, Beidelman, Koepping. Even outside anthropological circle, similar effect like de-familiarization had been widely discussed. For example, Kenneth Burke’s theory of “perspective by Incongruity” and James Fernandez’s idea of “edification by Puzzlement”, James Clifford’s re-evaluation of “collage” and “juxtaposition” and Gregory Bateson’s analysis that humour is born from “the confusion of logical types” or, much earlier, Freud’s notion of “displacement” in relation to jokes and dreams (1905). Such a de-familiarizing moment is no doubt pursued in any human society, though perhaps not to the extent

to which surrealists have explicitly and anthropologists implicitly experimented.

My question is; who is, in effect, this crazy fool, *caalk*, this Shadowy trickster to us? In his book “The Zande Trickster”, Evans-Pritchard gave us an extremely interesting interpretation of the Zande Trickster, called “Ture”. I think there is no more felicitous answer to the above question than this. I quote:

“Ture appeals to Azande because he does what he pleases, what in their hearts they would like to do themselves. He, Ture, kills his father. He tries to kill his son, he attempts to murder his wife, he has sexual congress with his mother-in-law. In the telling of the tales these monstrously uninhibited acts are accepted without demur. We may ask whether they are not pointer to dark desires. It is as if we are looking into a distorting mirror, except that they are not distortion. We really like that. What we see is the obverse of the appearance we like to present. What Ture does is the opposite of all that is moral; and it is all of us who are Ture. He is really ourselves. Behind the image, convention bids us present, in desire, in feeling, in imagination, and beneath the layer of consciousness we act as Ture does.

Let me stop my paper now by asking a final question very quickly. Donald Trump is certainly a genuine trickster in highest standard in a sense that no one can predict what he will do; but no one tries to liking him to an anthropologist or to ourselves as in Ture’s mirror. In order to come to term with the anxieties and anomy produced by him, why shouldn’t we try to de-familiarize ourselves rather than distancing ourselves from him, since both sides are two sides of the same coin called the American dream anyway?

Thank you.

(Nishii) Thank you very much. I hope we have some good affect by this symposium. Now I would like to invite professor Yanai to give coments for the keyquoted and three presentations.

## Comments

### Tadashi Yanai (University of Tokyo)



I am Tadashi Yanai and I am very honored to speak here, in this special occasion, with Professor Crapanzano, Professor Sugawara, Professor Okazaki, and Dr. Ikeda.

In this part of mine, I thought—maybe erroneously—I was expected to connect the four lectures. It has turned out that this is an extremely difficult task. I will try to consider them altogether but you will excuse me for missing, probably, many important points.

Let me say a word on my style of talk. I consider my way of thinking as anthropological, but—as some of you know—I tend to express my ideas relating them to philosophical terms. I am in no way dogmatic in this: I only want to see things from a different angle. Today, I find myself in an exceptional place because we have here Professor Crapanzano, who is such an admirable pioneer in combining ethnography, anthropology, literature, philosophy and other things. I feel lucky.

My comments are on three themes: (1) the imaginary, (2) the frame and the border, and (3) ethics or—I tentatively call it—ethics of the imaginary. I am not going to talk about affect in this comment. In fact, I did meditate on the first part of Professor Crapanzano's lecture. I know well that there surely is a fertile ground to discuss. But finally I discard it for lack of time.

So the first point: the imaginary. To introduce this term, I would like to quote a book by a French philosopher Gaston Bachelard, *La Flamme d'une chandelle* or *The Flame of a Candle* published in 1961, a year before the author's death (translated also into Japanese as *Rōusoku no honō*). To understand what Bachelard wants to say in this book, we have only to imagine what the title says literally, “the flame of a candle.” I quote Bachelard: “The flame forces us to imagine. In front of a flame, as soon as you dream or daydream, what you perceive is nothing compared with what you imagine”. When you are watching a flame, you are obliged to imagine. You know the fire is there, and you are perceiving it, but essentially, what you are doing at that moment is not exactly watching the fire but imagining.

We can say, in a way, that the flame of a candle arouses in us, “the imaginary” in its pure form. Now, we also understand immediately that in its less pure form, the imaginary is everywhere—albeit not in such a transparent way like in the flame of a candle. The imaginary is everywhere. Everything, every experience has imaginary connotations or resonances. The imaginary

accompanies the real as if it were its shadow. We imagine at the same time as we live. Of course, very often, we are not conscious of the imaginary side of our experience because we are too occupied with what we have to do. But it is there, silently, and sometimes it exerts its force without our knowing.

I think we can connect this kind of idea with all the four lectures today. But before entering into it, let me continue a little more with Bachelard. In the same introductory part of *The Flame of a Candle*, Bachelard reflects on the relationship between “the imaginary” and the past. These two are obviously connected because the flame reminds us many things—things of the past—uninterruptedly. But there is more. Bachelard thinks that this memory—aroused by the flame of a candle, for example—is not entirely individual.

“In front of that flame,” Bachelard says, “the daydreamer lives in the past which is not only his or hers anymore. The dreamer is in the past of the first fires of the world.” In a sense, fire is fire, everywhere: for us now and here, or for our earlier generations, or in Africa or in South America, 500 years ago, or 2,000 years ago. The images aroused in us, by things or events, are not only connected with my memory—my personal memory—but also with others’ memories without knowing, or even with the memory of those of the past we didn’t get to know.

I imagine that some of you may be skeptic about this idea, so I would like to mention my own ethnographic example. The Mapuche of Chile—with whom I did my field work—, when they do important rituals, they burn sacrificial animals to send them to their gods in the form of smoke. Without doubt, the fire is an essential part in these rituals. Although there are diverse forms of Mapuche rituals, they consider, in a way, that all rituals are essentially the same and they apply the same term to them: *konümpan*. *Konümpan* is a verb in infinitive form. *Konümpan* means: “to remember”. They “remember” when they see the smoke of their sacrificial animals going up into the sky. But the important question here is: “who remembers?” And, unexpectedly, the Mapuche’s answer—at least their theoretical answer—is this: their ancestors. When they watch the animals get burnt, they are one with their ancestors. They become ancestors who are doing the ritual. It is as their ancestors that the Mapuche “remember” in their ritual. In other words, they remember as if they were old, ancestral Mapuche, as if they were the first Mapuche. (Of course, you can easily imagine that there are other layers of their experiences, but here I limit myself to present the Mapuche’s theoretical idea.)

I have begun with this initial and long digression, firstly because this may be a good way to pay tribute to Professor Crapanzano’s work. We all know that he has always been working on the border of the imaginary—experimenting courageously on that insecure border. Just one example of it is this important book, *Imaginative Horizons: An essay in literary philosophical*

*anthropology*, published in 2003. Now, on the other hand, I also think the idea of imaginary offers us a good perspective to the entire symposium.

To begin with, I wonder if what Professor Sugawara terms as “virtual environment” might also be called imaginary environment. Actually, the original Japanese term Professor Sugawara uses in Japanese is *kyokankyo* and the word “kyo”, though translated here as virtual, reminds me of the mathematical term *kyosū*, the imaginary number. *Kyosū* are imaginary numbers, the “i”s, which are combined with real numbers to form complex numbers. I should add that in physics complex numbers are completely real. I suspect Sugawara sensei conceived the idea of virtual environment also as imaginary environment. He may disagree but it will be an interesting topic to discuss.

Ikeda-san’s Lebanese case is also extremely interesting in this regard. I would say that behind their daily speech, simple speech or act, the imaginary is always present. In his book, Ikeda-san makes a long ethnographic description of opening and closing a shutter—though he has not mentioned it today—and analyzes it in detail. If I use this example, I would say that the simple act of opening and closing a shutter is accompanied by “the imaginary”; and that part is so important or more important than real act of opening and closing shutter. The flow of the real is accompanied by the flow of the imaginary and people know that. And people daily work with both sides. The imaginary in this Lebanese case would be, of course, necessarily connected with past memories including those of the Civil War.

The relationship of Professor Okazaki’s lecture with imaginary is evident: nightmares, on the one hand, and the fools, on the other. These are things and people that arouse the imaginary in the people’s experience: the Gamk know, much better than both Westerners and us, about how to cope with the imaginary.

The second point is about framedness: explicitly mentioned in Professor Crapanzano’s lecture and also in that of Professor Sugawara. Gregory Bateson in his famous essay on “Play and Fantasy” mentions a curious example from Radcliffe-Brown’s *Andaman Islanders*. He cites this as an example of a peace-making ceremonies, ceremonies in which tribal war becomes bracketed and incorporated into the frame of a ritual. In this way, the Andaman Islanders try to reduce something like *off-frame* phenomenon of war into an *in-frame* event of mock fight. The interesting thing here is that this may not necessarily lead to a successful result. I quote Bateson: “In the Andaman Islands, peace is concluded after each side has been given ceremonial freedom to strike the other. This example, however, also illustrates the labile nature of the frame, ‘This is play’ or ‘This is ritual.’” And some lines later: “The ritual blows of peacemaking are always liable to be mistaken for the real blows of combat. In this event, the peace-making ceremony becomes a battle, a real battle.”

The lesson I would like to take from Bateson’s reflection is that the outside and the inside might always be connected underneath. I say this because I have the impression that both social-structuralist and semiotic interpretations of the ritual—I include here Victor Turner—flattened this underneath connection. The tendency in anthropology has been to discuss about the imaginary only in a bracketed place. I think that the imaginary is potentially everywhere both inside the frame and outside of it. And here enters the border question. I would like to add that, in the original theory of rituals by Arnold Van Gennep, this aspect was clearly contemplated. In the first chapter of *The Rites of Passage*, he develops a theory of dynamism as contrasted with that of animism. The term “dynamism” here must be understood in the Greek sense of the term *dunamis*, which means “power” or “potentiality”. Van Gennep thought, in essence, that rituals are necessary because the spacetime in which people live is filled with power, with *dunamis*. It is not a void spacetime as in the social structuralist or semiotic theory. It is filled with power, by which the inside of the frame is connected with the outside of the frame. So the key question would be: how to manage the border.

I have prepared comments on the four lectures in this regard. But time obliges me to focus on Professor Crapanzano’s dense and moving lecture. I think the discussion was precisely about the border between the inside and the outside of the frame. One point I have been particularly interested is why Conservative Evangelicals support Trump so ardently. When I read the lines, I was reminded of the famous formula of the philosopher Kant, “the sublime”, especially “the dynamic sublime”. The “dynamic sublime” is something that surpasses any possible imagination, just like these natural phenomena that we have experienced this year in Japan: storms, torrential rains, earthquakes, typhoons or even nuclear accidents. Sublime means *sub*: underneath and *lime*: border. The power that comes from underneath the border is so big, so unimaginably big that it becomes awe-inspiring. Of course, the dynamic sublime that Trump creates (I would ask Professor Crapanzano’s pardon if I am overinterpreting it) would be a false one, or better, “simulacrum of the sublime”. The outside he introduces is not the real outside. It is not based on the real power of the world, but it only simulates it. This is why, I think, he is in the end self-destructive himself as Professor Crapanzano talked about it. The fact remains that, so far as this “simulacrum of the sublime” is by some or many as “sublime” albeit partially, or with sense of humor, we will surely be on a fragile ground. I was remembering a case which is more familiar to me: Catalan independentist movement. In Barcelona, many people have come to avoid talking each other because of the independence problem. So it is a very similar situation. There are people, in the US, and in Catalonia, and in other places of Europe and maybe in the world, likewise wait for a magical solution to all problems.

I will touch very briefly on my third point: the ethics of the imaginary, which is related with the Trump case. As I understand it, Trump introduces only the simulacrum of the sublime and this is the difference I think from Qandish's case who did not lose touch of the border even when he transgressed it. I imagine that somehow Qandish knew how to keep in touch with the reality even in those moments and the reverse is the case with Trump.

And this is why I think the anthropology and the imaginary is so important. Anthropologists, if we seriously turn to the problem of the imaginary, are in the best position to treat this problem. In each case we should ask: what kind of the imaginary is there? The important question here is, perhaps, what I may call "the strength of the imaginary". Is this imaginary strong one, or weak one, or fake one? Professor Sugawara has emphasized importance of describing the density and the intensity of virtual environment. Following this idea, I would like to say: "the density and intensity of imaginary environment".

I believe that objective description is important in ethnography, not so much because the objectiveness is more convincing, but because it is strong; it is denser, more intense. Of course, there are other ways to arrive at this density or intensity. Literally imagination is one of them, as Professor Crapanzano has already shown so beautifully and also Professor Sugawara has shown through his writings.

Personally, I am more convinced now than before the symposium that we should "imagarize" social sciences: on politics, economy, technology, etc. (and here I am thinking about old French sociologist, Gabriel Tarde as precursor of this line of thought). But first we should re-imagarize anthropology. For this, we should read Professor Crapanzano's work perhaps with new eyes, to rediscover them and to extend those discoveries to other places.

## Discussion

(Nishii) Thank you very much to fulfill completely the difficult task which make comments to 4 presentations and draw useful and promising discussion. Now first, I would like to ask each presenter to respond to Prof. Yanai's comment.

(Crapanzano) . . .

(Nishii) Thank you very much.

(Ikeda) Thank you very much. Actually, it is again difficult to respond to the comment, but actually I was thinking if I should use a term "imaginary" or "imagine" because while I was preparing, I read part of Dr. Vincent's work, *Imaginative Horizons*, but eventually, I gave up the idea. But on the other hand, as for the word "imaginary", I realized as an anthropologist who is working for Lebanon, the term "imaginary" should have been familiar because there is a paper by anthropologist Michael Gilson, which is about lying, and it is quite famous paper. In that paper, Gilson warns us not to take lying as just giving false information but he also pointed out, though I cannot remember what the exact phrase was, but I suppose he phrased like that lying is kind of imaginary universe. That is why as a researcher to understand Lebanon, I should have tried to explore the word more seriously but at this stage today, I cannot really develop my idea. I just tell you fragments of what I remembered.

(Sugawara) I was almost moved by Professor Yanai's very stimulating comment. Two points I would like to answer.

The first is on imaginary or virtual. I must confess that, for very long time, I have struggled to escape from Jean-Paul Sartre's dichotomy between perception and what you think imagination or nothingness. Recently, I came to think if we will maintain this dichotomy between nothingness and being, perception is filled with present being. Imagination is filled with nothingness. But if we think about the time, this dichotomy comes out untenable, because we cannot define the present moment itself. In this morning, we met and greeted each other just at that moment, while it has now retreated into imaginary environment. Then, every present moment is always retreating into imaginary. I think such kind of wondrous image is nonsense. We have to grasp the present moment, as always having some thickness, that is inseparable from our behavior. Plainly

speaking, from wakeup to sleep, this thickness is the meaningful present, I think.

Second, adding some comments. I also confess that when I was listening to Hideaki Terashima's presentation concerning body resources, I was greatly stimulated because he coined the term "the body of imaginary figure." Terashima himself thought about the imaginary body and this imaginary has very close relationship to mathematical concept of imaginary, but I avoid to use this imaginary because of the reason previously I mentioned, an antipathy against Sartrean dichotomy.

The second point is, I am very interested in the metaphor of shadow, and also in the actual shadow common with Professor Okazaki's presentation. I wonder – very difficult in my point – our life is a circle surrounding open air fire. All the people, all the existence move on into the light around the open air fire from the darkness and, after some time-lags have passed, they all retreat into the dark. This beautiful metaphor I encountered Kenzaburo Oe's novel. This darkness around the open air fire and the shadow, are they the same? For me, they do not look like the same phenomenon because the shadow is very, very important resource for us to live under the strong sunshine. Without shadow, all mammals cannot live in African savanna, I think. Shadow is wonderful, while we are afraid of darkness. On the other hand curiously many people also care for the shadow in very negative sense. Actually, the G|ui people are afraid of a pregnant woman because "she has a shadow." In this case, the shadow is a dangerous power that makes the condition of a patient worse. My interest is in the positive and negative meaning of shadow. In my youth, I have tried to read Bachelard, but it was too difficult for me, so I am not acquainted with Bachelard. This is my temporal response.

(Nishii) Thank you. Professor Okazaki, please

(Okazaki) I do not know it there is any question for me, but I wish to talk a little bit more about the Shadow and tricksters. As I said, the term Shadow is a metaphor of an invisible or hidden aspect of the world, human, thing, and matter. The point is that we no longer take the ontological status of the Shadow seriously after the Age of Enlightenment in the 16th century when the light superseded the shadow, as if the plain-literalistic light eliminated the metaphorical shadow. W.V.O. Quine warned, "It is a mistake, then, to think of linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body and metaphorical in its trimming... The neatly worked inner stretches of science are an open space in the tropical jungle, cleared by clearing tropes away" ("A postscript on metaphor", 1979:160) . A similar insight was also made by early Freud, "It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious ... the unconscious is the larger sphere, which includes within it the

smaller sphere of the conscious” (“The Interpretation of Dreams”, 1900). In this wider context, I'd like to talk about the Shadow, trickster and Donald Trump altogether.

So far, I don't know if any anthropologist has ever tried to discuss Trump as a trickster. My point is that in order to come to term with the anxieties and anomy produced by him, we should try to de-familiarize ourselves rather than distancing ourselves from Trump. I refer to the Evans-Pritchard's understanding of tricksters. Azande people, at first, do not see their tricksters, “Ture”, as similar to them. But they accept Ture because Ture can be an awful but also interesting figure, like the Shadow and *caalk* among the Gamk, suggesting something of hidden aspect of people's desires, as if they were distorted mirror images. Why, on the other hand, Democrats simply hate and criticized him; why they cannot see Donald Trump as their mirror image. Actually Donald Trump has never been possible if Obama was not the president before. All are just mirroring each other and this mirror itself is, I think, the product of the American dream.

(Nishii) Do you like to ask someone or...?

(Okazaki) No. Maybe, again, I would like to know the reaction from Vincent upon these issues.

(Crapanzano) . . .

(Nishii) Thank you. Now, I would like to invite comments or questions. from the ardience

(Toriyama) I have two questions. First one is pretty easy. It is about *caalk*. Is once a *caalk*, forever a *caalk*? I mean, is there any situational aspect to just being of *caalk*? That is my first question. My second question is, I think it is a problem of the metaphor. I mean for people like me who does not really have much of knowledge, I get really confused by this word shadow. Is shadow means shadow as it is as shadow or shadow as a place without light? That is my question. Thank you.



(Toriyama) The first one is for...

(Okazaki) Shadow, I think we have talked about the shadow...

(Toriyama) Well, *caalk*. Can I ask you about *caalk*? My question is, once *caalk*, forever a *caalk*?

Is there any situational aspect? Once, he is defined as *caalk*, when he started identifying himself to be a *caalk*, then people always knew that he is acting as a *caalk* or is there other kinds that he is not acting as a *caalk*? That is my question. Is there any situational aspect plays?

(Okazaki) I mentioned little bit in my paper today, but actually it is quite strange. They are not something like a group people who have to play roles in ritual occasions, but every day; they cannot get married because they are lazy and they do not want to work in the farm, but people are happy to give them something to eat. I do not know why that sort of people are there, still it is kind of deep question, I mean, how it is possible for such people. Even such people are somehow special because most of them are twin born children. Twin born people sometimes are not seen as human. It is not just idea, but they are treated in a very special way. That is what I observed and as I said I could not have any meaningful discussion with them. They actually do not talk so much. They just talk sometimes completely lie or just nonsense. They like to sing and dance. From Japanese point of view, they are somehow mad people.

(Nishii) The second...

(Toriyama) The reason why I asked this is because I really found the problem with this analogy of being Trump as a trickster as like a *caalk*. Because the problem arises from this incongruity like you keep talking about, we cannot expect Trump to be a trickster or he is claimed as a president because he is not comedian after all, so we cannot just laugh at him all the time. He has this trickster side, but at the same time, he is a president. That creates a problem. I really get the point; I agree with what has been discussed. I thought maybe that point I can ask individually later. Thank you.

(Nishii) And about the second question about the shadow? Please, A brief reply.

(Crapanzano) . . .

(Nishii) Okay, I would like to invite another one or two questions. Please.

(Miyasaka) I would like to just raise roughly two points. One point is that because anthropology to think about, we call it an empirical method, so that like the phase of imaginary and real, that

kind of friction will be finally measured. Although, I understand that Dr. Ikeda and Professor Sugawara used kind of different terms, it was important to bridging of point of Professor Sugawara’s approach focusing on first microscopic interaction. That needs partly conversation analysis, and probably sort of record of the meta-movie, just like a meta-gestural aspect as well or supplementary data and also try to analyze the function of the meta-communicational frame where the anthropologist and the informant and other people try to negotiate and the conversational sequence is complex product of this introduction. That is very clear I think philosophically speaking, but Professor Yanai’s philosophical approach also, I think, is very important. I would like to emphasize these aspects. Professor Yanai did not talk more about it in political perspective, but anyway.



The second part is coping with sort of very anxiety. We train to have overcome or passively avoid of anxiety in various situation just like Dr. Ikeda talked about or consummate of the sectarian divide. Although, the secretarial divide is very, very essential part so that the anxiety settles. Situation can be solved from this approach. Also, I think there would be some examples such as try to make belief to prepare. This kind of dramatical expression although really able to real embodied feeling. That is also another way of changing situation. This is also ■■■ and try to go back to the classical example, the case of the shared value is one of the examples. That is try to transform aggressive feeling on the frame of ritual reforms of feeling. I would like to raise this kind of aspect also to be analyzed.

Finally, talking about the President Donald Trump or Trump, his original name, real people tend to encourage him as joker or trickster so that we tend to be kind of avoid the real sort of state, granting of real situation. That is kind of emergence of anxiety situation. But we think that he will be going away later so that more a transitional sort of space and we thought over that try to adapt to very difficult situation by interpreting in that way, and also, sometimes try to transform the anxiety situation. Some people decided not to look at the real situation like in the case of Europe and I think from South Africa. Some people tend to have certain mode of hope. That is really effective I think. On the other hand, this kind of forgetting the real situation and also anyway I wrote some sort of delusion of UFO and so on. It is more liminal sort of phase of mind. This is also one way of avoiding situation. I am so interested in this kind of preventive avoiding anxiety related situation. That might be also big research topic.

(Nishii) Is it just comment?. You would like to be responded by someone, no?

(Miyasaka) I just tried to add the dimension of passive inclination, just avoid. I tried to raise a question relating microscopic analysis and ■■■ .

(Nishii) Okay. Thank you. Now, we are almost timed up, so the last question if someone would like to say something. No? Okay.

Thank you very much for fruitful discussions today. For all presenters and commentators, please give them a big hand.



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